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1in the condition in which god created them.  This is 
now losing ground to a paradigm that recognizes 
that virtually all of the world’s ecosystems have 
evolved under varying intensities of human use 
for millennia. We are moving from conserving the 
pristine wildernesses of a mythical “Edenic” past to 
nurturing values to meet the needs of societies of 
the future. 
The actual conservation model that is still being 
imposed upon developing countries is essentially 
one from the late European colonial era of setting 
aside very large areas of forest with presumed 
minimal past disturbance from humans.  In the 
“new world”, this was best evidenced by conserva-
tion models that sought to preserve a primordial 
Amazon forest, not realizing that these forests 
were heavily cultivated by populations decimated 
by contact, leaving behind the deep black soils 
terra preta, that have become a reference point for 
the food sovereignty and climate change move-
ment.2 Curiously the domestic European model—
small areas intensively managed to protect sharply 
defined biodiversity values set in a matrix of 
carefully managed multi-functional landscapes—is 
not being attempted in the developing world.  This 
is a pity as this integrated approach may be exactly 
what is needed in emerging economies with land 
shortages and needs to increase production of 
food and commodities as well as the need to main-
tain biodiversity values.
The challenges of finding appropriate arrange-
ments for forest ownership and use rights are not 
restricted to developing countries. In Western Eu-
rope forest ownership and rights have continually 
evolved for over a thousand years.3 In England an 
exhaustive inventory of land and forest ownership 
and use was conducted in the 11th Century—the 
famous Domesday Book. Long before that inven-
tory, forest lands had been subject to constant 
Conservation organizations are becoming increas-
ingly aware of the need to deal equitably with local 
peoples’ rights to forest land and forest resources. 
“Rights-based” approaches to conservation are 
being widely promoted.1 In many situations these 
“Rights-based Approaches” are evolving alongside 
major forest governance reform initiatives. 
These two trends might be expected to seek similar 
goals – greater equity and certainty over who can 
use forests and for what purpose. The reality is that 
the processes of governance and rights reform are 
revealing underlying tensions between the needs 
to husband the local values of forests versus the 
need to conserve the so-called public goods values 
that accrue to society at large. Reconciling the 
trade-offs between local and public goods values 
will be a major challenge for resource managers in 
coming decades. 
The end of the 20th Century saw a major focus on 
conserving global forest values through inter-
national agreements and conventions, soft law 
initiatives such as certification and site-based ne-
gotiations, often within the context of Integrated 
Conservation and Development Projects (ICDPs). 
These approaches are now losing support as inter-
national processes get bogged down in semantics 
and political correctness and lose credibility, and 
there is little empirical evidence that ICDPs deliver 
either international public goods or local develop-
ment.
Classic field approaches to conservation are also 
being challenged. Government-sponsored pro-
tected areas and measures to counter perceived 
threats to pristine nature developed from a conser-
vation paradigm that is no longer widely accepted. 
This classic approach is derived from the wilder-
ness ethic of Old World settlers and explorers mov-
ing into forests and plains that they assumed to be 
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changes in ownership and use.4 Pogue Harrison5 
and Schama6 have argued that the constant quest 
for equitable use of forest lands between the 
state and local people has been a major force in 
shaping human societies as we now know them. 
The relations between monarchs and the serfdom 
in Europe have revolved around questions of land, 
labor and forest use. As democratic processes have 
emerged, contentious issues of forest tenure have 
been subject to court rulings that constitute a 
large body of case law and have fuelled constant 
revisions of formal bodies of legislation. Most gov-
ernments now place restrictions and obligations 
upon owners of forests to require them to manage 
their forests in ways that are consistent with the 
national or global good, while others have asserted 
national ownership of large areas of forest. These 
processes of constant negotiation and revision of 
forest ownership and use arrangements continue 
today in many countries and will doubtless persist 
into the future.7
The outcome of these long-term processes of 
adapting forest ownership and rights regimes to 
changing conditions has been that many European 
countries have extensive state-owned forests 
alongside large numbers of small patches of for-
est land under private ownership. France is said 
to have 4 million forest owners. However while 
people own freehold title to their forests, their 
rights to use the forests and the land upon which 
they grow are severely restricted by the state. For 
instance, owners of forest areas of less than 4 ha 
in France are obliged to allow public access for 
hunting and gathering certain products, while they 
themselves are subject to severe restrictions as 
to what they can hunt or gather. Even in private 
forests timber, landscape, watershed and wildlife 
values are subject to state control.
Easterly8 provides a good illustration of similar 
long, drawn-out negotiations over land rights in 
the United States. His family has been contesting 
its rights to an area of land for over 200 years and 
the issues have still not been totally resolved. 
Easterly makes this point in relation to attempts 
by international development assistance agencies 
to fast-track tenure reform in developing countries. 
He argues that attempting to impose external 
concepts of land ownership and tenure onto differ-
ent cultures and political systems is fraught with 
danger, with a very high likelihood of unsustain-
able and inequitable outcomes. His thesis does not 
run counter to that of de Soto9 and his followers 
who see the attribution of land title as a key to 
economic advancement; however, Easterley argues 
that these processes are complex and cannot be 
accelerated at the whim of an external agent.
Activists concerned with the rights of forest-
dwelling peoples often contest the legitimacy of 
legal frameworks used to allocate and manage 
forest lands. They may also contest the legitimacy 
of decision-making processes that put these legal 
frameworks into place and enforce them. The situ-
ation is especially contested where independent 
sovereign states operate under constitutions and 
laws shaped by colonial powers and reinforced by 
post-independence governments whose primary 
focus was on “nation-building”. There are numer-
ous examples of political and military elites usurp-
ing control of forest lands and enriching them-
selves through the exploitation of their timber 
and mineral resources. Forms of words which were 
originally clothed in respectability such as “Crown 
lands”, “State Forest Reserves”, etc. lose their 
credibility as they come to be associated with land 
grabs by powerful individuals endowed with state 
power, but using it for private ends. In Indonesia 
and many other tropical countries the business 
and military elites were party to the allocation of 
much of the forest to concessions which they then 
exploited for their personal benefits. 
3Biodiversity presents special challenges in deter-
mining optimum arrangements for use and owner-
ship of forests. Biodiversity has certain values that 
accrue primarily to the global community while 
local owners and users of the forest lack effective 
mechanisms to profit from these values. Although 
most local users will value some components of 
biodiversity, they will not necessarily manage 
forests in ways that meet broader biodiversity 
conservation objectives such as those enshrined in 
the Convention on Biological Diversity.10
A major problem comes from the fact that a sig-
nificant part of the conservation lobby attaches 
high value to pristine or old-growth forests. There 
is a deeply held belief among many conservation 
biologists that forests are fragile systems and that 
even minor disturbances may result in catastrophic 
change and loss of species and of environmental 
benefits. This mind-set emerged in the 1970s and 
1980s when surveys revealed the amazing spe-
cies diversity of tropical rainforests. Since the 
functioning of these forest systems was poorly 
understood, it was argued that a precautionary 
approach should be applied. While this approach 
seeks to guide decision-making in the absence of 
quantifiable risk, many rainforest advocates went 
well beyond the original intent and promoted zero 
or close-to-zero disturbance.  Today there is little 
empirical evidence for this assumed fragility of 
pristine forests, and it is now widely accepted that 
virtually all forests are dynamic systems that have 
evolved under changing conditions of climate and 
human management.  Although the notion of a 
stable “steady-state” has been replaced by one of 
a dynamic, self-organizing system, some conserva-
tionists still contest the possibility that rainforests 
can be used sustainably. 
The perceived need to maintain pristine or 
old-growth forests required local communities 
to forgo all use. There is no logical reason why 
local stakeholders would subscribe to this view 
of conservation. This would require that they 
forsake all potential benefits from the forest and 
underlying land with no remuneration in order to 
secure hypothetical climate and use values for an 
unspecified global community. The adoption of the 
Ecosystem Principles by the Convention on Biologi-
cal Diversity in 2002 was a significant watershed 
in international recognition of the fact that such 
total protection paradigms are not broadly accept-
able to citizens, especially in poorer countries.11
The Ecosystem Principles of the CBD are a signifi-
cant challenge to those conservation programmes 
that are strongly rooted in a tradition of achieving 
biodiversity goals through designating forests 
with high conservation values as lands that only 
the State can safeguard by designating them as 
protected areas or national forests and denying 
local use. Earlier conservation models based upon 
a paradigm of withholding private individual or 
community use rights and tenure are now under 
serious challenge. 
 
Many traditional conservationists continue to fear 
that awarding tenure over forest lands to local 
communities will accelerate the process of forest 
conversion to agriculture and industrial uses.12 
These authors argue that local land owners will ei-
ther convert their forests for intensive productive 
uses or else sell their rights to corporate purchas-
ers, leading to consolidation of land into larger 
industrial holdings designed to extract maximum 
commercial value from the land. The arguments 
that such prospects can simply be countered by 
making payments for environmental services to 
owners of small areas of forest are contested.13 
The harsh reality for conservation is that, for 
most local people, conversion to agriculture or to 
industrial estate crops provides a faster route out 
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of poverty than either local forest management or 
total protection.14  
The issue of how local rights, poverty reduction 
and the conservation of public goods can be recon-
ciled is complex and poorly understood.   The rest 
of this paper will challenge some long-standing, 
conventional narratives and build the case for 
a more differentiated and patient approach to 
resolve what is a highly complex and long-term 
dilemma.
Among the development community there is a 
strong movement to devolve rights and tenure 
of forest lands—previously, at least nominally, 
held by governments—to individuals, communi-
ties, clans and first nations.15 There is also now 
recognition of the fact that private individuals and 
communities are often the de facto owners and 
managers of forests.16 
The principal logic behind this emerging tendency 
is that because the poor and marginal inhabitants 
of forests areas are highly dependent on those 
forests for their livelihoods, legitimizing and secur-
ing their rights to the resources of the forests is an 
ethical imperative. Government agencies charged 
with managing forests have rarely recognized the 
value that forests have for local people and have 
tended to place their emphasis on industrial timber 
interests, watershed values or wildlife rather than 
people. National laws often make explicit reference 
to local forest rights and to processes of consulta-
tion in imposing changes in these rights, but these 
aspects of the law are often poorly applied. Contre-
ras and Fay17 have documented the lack of atten-
tion to local legal rights in Indonesia. Sayer et al.18 
have shown that while people use and occupy a 
significant proportion of many of the forests glob-
ally significant for biodiversity—sites listed under 
the World Heritage Convention—they nevertheless 
retain much of their biodiversity value. 
The extent to which the allocation of local use 
and tenure rights is a threat or an opportunity for 
 devolution of tenure and rights to forests:
 risk or opportunity for conservation
either local development or conservation depends 
very much upon the situation. Among conservation 
practitioners there is now considerable experience 
of ways in which the threats can be minimized and 
the opportunities exploited.19 In determining the 
course of action in any particular situation it helps 
to establish typologies of conditions. 
There are two fundamental approaches to reconcil-
ing the rights of local communities to use and 
benefit from forest resources with the stewardship 
of public goods values.  The state may establish 
protected areas but award rights to people to 
use the areas in ways that are consistent with 
the maintenance of conservation values. IUCN 
Category V and VI protected areas are examples 
of this. Alternatively, the state can recognize local 
ownership or use rights but place, or negotiate, 
restrictions or easements on these rights to ensure 
the maintenance of public goods conservation 
values.
The principle international conservation organiza-
tions have, at least until recently, been strongly 
aligned with the first approach. There has been 
an unwillingness to accept the reality that groups 
such as the Dayaks in Borneo or the Pygmies in 
the Congo Basin generally derive more benefits 
from managed forests or even non-forest uses of 
the land.20 In the absence of tourism it is difficult 
to find examples of strong local constituencies for 
totally protected areas. 
5The second approach, private or community owner-
ship mediated by restrictions, is widespread in 
developed economies. National Parks and Natural 
Parks in Europe are virtually all matrices of private 
and public land where uses are regulated to 
achieve environmental outcomes. We are only now 
witnessing the emergence of greater interest in 
exploring the potential for this second approach in 
developing countries. The expansion of the number 
of areas managed under so called “landscape ap-
proaches” to conservation is indicative of this shift 
toward the second approach.
Landscape approaches seek to optimize conserva-
tion outcomes by negotiating landscape mosa-
ics composed of an appropriate mix of different 
degrees of protection and varying intensities of 
production within the broader landscape matrix. 
Landscape approaches can often be just a new 
name for spatial planning with ultimate control 
remaining in the hands of the state. However in 
its best manifestations landscape approaches are 
accompanied by, or reinforce, the devolution of 
real decision-making power and achieve conser-
vation objectives through an appropriate mix of 
local and national stewardship.21 The conservation 
community is going through a healthy process of 
self-examination about protected areas.22 Although 
the pristine nature lobby is fighting a fierce rear-
guard action, the movement toward conservation 
in multi-functional landscapes is emerging as the 
most acceptable solution in developing countries 
with high levels of poverty.
In the Amazon, for example, 20 percent of the land 
is protected by state or national law, 21 percent is 
indigenous territory, 24 percent is private (some of 
which is illegal), and 35 percent is officially open 
access.23 However much of this open access forest 
is probably subjected to unrecognized traditional 
uses and rights by Amerindian peoples. There are 
good examples of excellent conservation steward-
ship in at least the first three of these categories 
and most would agree that the best conservation 
and development outcomes will be from an appro-
priate mix of all four categories. In tropical Africa 
and Asia the proportion of forest lands nominally 
under state control is much higher; therefore 
fewer examples exist of significant achievement 
of conservation of public goods values such as 
biodiversity in forests under private or indigenous 
management. 
One argument in favour of providing local owner-
ship and trusteeship to forests is that governments 
have often done a poor job of conservation. Cur-
ren24 has shown that the rate of forest loss even in 
officially gazetted protected areas in Indonesia is 
higher than in forests under management. Some 
government forest departments have been notori-
ous for their high levels of corruption. Their entire 
existence appears to be oriented towards captur-
ing rents from the exploitation of the forests under 
their stewardship. 
Some advocates of local rights and tenure argue 
that local stakeholders will manage the forests 
better if they are only provided with secure use 
rights and tenure. This has been well documented 
in Nepal,25 Mexico26 and parts of Eastern Africa. 
However the story is much more complex than this 
and there may be as many examples where the 
transition to more equitable tenure arrangements 
has not been followed by an improved delivery of 
public good values.27 
Arguments in favour of giving responsibility for 
forest management to communities tend to carry 
more weight in areas with low forest cover. Thus 
in Eastern Africa there is a body of evidence that 
suggests that local management is better for main-
taining forest cover than government manage-
ment.28 In these areas there is a better chance of 
retaining large areas of forest under an appropri-
ate mix of local management schemes than under 
government control, so the automatic securing of 
local rights will tend to provide the best route to 
conservation. In forest rich areas such as the Congo 
Basin and the island of Borneo, there is a more 
differentiated story.29  One significant impetus for 
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devolving management to local people is to avoid 
the inequities created by industrial-scale land 
grabbing for timber, agriculture, mineral extrac-
tion and biofuel plantations. This, combined with 
government-planned conversion to estate crops is 
clearly one of the greatest threats to natural forest 
conservation. In addition, industrial scale schemes 
favour imported labor, which in numerous cases 
have negatively impacted local livelihoods. Much 
of the movement in favour of local forest rights is 
driven by the need to support local people in their 
struggle against officially sanctioned and illegal 
land-grabs. While industrial-scale investments 
can create local employment and fuel economic 
growth, it also can reinforce hardship among the 
most marginalized groups.  Nevertheless, the per-
ception that large-scale land-use investments are 
universally bad for local people is too simplistic, 
and there is evidence from a number of countries 
that the potential risk of land-grabbing can be 
mitigated by working through and with local for-
est owners and users. Activists have worked with 
communities in Indonesia, Central Africa and South 
America to register their traditional forest rights in 
order to empower them to resist outsiders seeking 
to take over their land. 
While tenure reform can be used as countermea-
sure against large-scale land grabbing, it is prob-
ably of more limited use in areas that experience 
significant spontaneous or forced population 
movements. Refugees and internally displaced 
peoples in Central Africa constitute major challeng-
es both for conservation and for the security of the 
livelihoods of local farmers. Victims of conflicts did 
not want to be displaced and would welcome the 
possibility of returning to their original homes. The 
reality is that these people now number hundreds 
of millions around the world and they desperately 
need rights to land and resources. In the Democrat-
ic Republic of Congo and Burundi, they are often 
resettled in the only land that was not already 
occupied—the protected areas. 
In many other parts of the world the legacy of 
historical populations movements still hinders 
the process of defining appropriate and equitable 
tenure and user rights arrangements. 
Untangling the complex, and often highly differ-
entiated, relationship between local rights and 
the conservation of public goods has been further 
complicated by a lack of precision from the conser-
vation community in articulating the rationale for 
certain areas to be set-aside from local use.  While 
threats-based approaches to conservation are 
quite precise—though not always correct—about 
the nature of the impending threat to the biodiver-
sity of an area, they tend to be more ambiguous 
about the exact biodiversity attributes that need 
to be protected, and rarely do they define what 
would constitute an adequate outcome.  As many 
threats-based approaches focus on stopping the 
threat rather than creatively pursuing precise 
outcomes, they inevitably tend to prescribe exclu-
sionary measures.  For example, in Costa Rica in the 
mid-1990s, measures to protect declining popula-
tions of the Great Green Macaw in the Sarapiqui 
plains prohibited private landowners from harvest-
ing a particularly valuable tree species, Dipterix 
panamensis, from forests that they had retained 
on their own land.  The money used to enforce 
this ban could have, under an outcome-based ap-
proach, been used to support a payment to owners 
to protect nesting trees, and thus would have 
made the delivery of this particular public good an 
attractive proposition for local farmers.  Instead, a 
threats-based approach to the conservation of this 
particular species served only to further isolate lo-
 local rights and protected areas
7cal opinion from conservationists’ objectives.
Human rights and indigenous peoples’ activist 
groups have sometimes contested the status of 
certain government imposed protected areas 
because they were established without taking 
adequate account of traditional local rights and 
uses.30 In several countries the protected status 
of forests has been successfully challenged in the 
courts on the grounds of eminent domain. Often 
the formal protected areas were established on 
areas where existing rights were not officially re-
voked. There are many cases where protected areas 
were established in areas subject to low intensity 
human use on the assumption that these uses were 
marginal or insignificant. For the people concerned 
these uses may have been essential elements of 
their livelihoods.31 Formal protected areas rarely 
coincided with the often extensive networks of 
sacred groves and other forms of locally initiated 
protected areas.
As land pressures increase and democratic pro-
cesses become more effective, the extent of these 
challenges to protected areas by indigenous com-
munities is growing. Fears have been expressed 
that the present conservation programmes that 
deploy a threats-based approach to make the case 
for the establishment of as many protected areas 
as possible as the prime ways of achieving conser-
vation are inherently unsustainable.32 Cameroon 
and Cambodia have allocated around one quarter 
of their total land area to conservation, and one 
wonders whether future populations of those 
countries will tolerate the opportunity cost that 
this may impose on their economic development. 
There have been recent commitments to greatly ex-
pand the protected area estates of the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, Gabon and Madagascar in spite 
of the fact that the existing protected areas are 
poorly managed and have weak national constitu-
encies. 
Zuidema et al.33 have argued in favour of matrices 
of small or intermediate-sized totally protected 
areas set within the broader landscape of managed 
agricultural and forest systems. The logic is that 
such a landscape matrix will improve the flows 
of benefits to local people from the land and thus 
minimize the opportunity costs of conservation. 
Zuidema et al.34 provide evidence that such an ap-
proach is consistent with the achievement of many 
biodiversity conservation goals. Such outcome-
based approaches to conservation where small, 
strategically located nature reserves—many on pri-
vate land—enable the maintenance of key habitats 
are already the core of protected areas systems in 
many developed countries and of some developing 
countries, Costa Rica being the prime example.
 does tenure reform offer opportunities
 for conservation?
Setting aside for the moment the ethical and social 
justice rational for tenure reform of state-owned 
forest land, the principle argument for local owner-
ship as a conservation tool is that local people may 
be more inclined to protect forests if they can earn 
a living from ecotourism or other sustainable uses, 
and they may be more likely to succeed in this if 
they have permanent rights to those forests.
This is consistent with the emerging interest in 
schemes to compensate people for the conserva-
tion of environmental services, including biodi-
versity. In most cases it will only be possible to 
draw up the terms of the necessary contractual 
arrangements and eventually make such incen-
tive payments if local rights and ownership are 
clear and legally recognized. Such payments are 
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widespread in the developed world for forests 
that are in private ownership and where taxation 
and agricultural statistics enable calculations 
of production benefits foregone to favor biodi-
versity. Similarly conservation organizations are 
able to purchase and protect important forests 
when they are in private ownership. Conservation 
programmes in most developed countries depend 
heavily on protected areas purchased by founda-
tions and conservation NGOs. They may be owned 
by conservation organizations as in the United 
Kingdom; by private individuals as in South Africa 
or Costa Rica; or under the Trusts for Nature in 
several states in Australia.
Private ownership and use rights regimes open 
the way for arrangements under which govern-
ments or conservation organizations could lease 
protected areas. Extensive areas of aboriginal land 
in Australia have been leased by the government 
for conservation.35 The payments are negotiated 
and are intended to match the low revenues that 
the aborigines might achieve by farming the land.  
Such schemes work well when the economic poten-
tial of the land for other uses is low. Attempts to 
lease forest concessions for conservation in Guy-
ana and Cameroon have demonstrated how high 
the potential timber rents for these lands are, espe-
cially to government officials. Conservation conces-
sions and leases are interesting not only because 
they do enable the true costs of conservation to be 
evaluated, but also because they should—at least 
in theory—compel the lessee to better define the 
biodiversity attributes they wish to see conserved 
and the nature of the conservation outcome they 
wish to attain. 
There is an emerging interest in private nature 
reserves in tropical countries. These reserves have 
long been important in industrialized countries 
but have failed to make major impacts in develop-
ing countries due to little interest by local purchas-
ers and fears by potential international investors 
that their land rights would not be defensible 
under national law. Nonetheless private nature 
reserves are making significant contributions to 
biodiversity conservation in Costa Rica, Ecuador, 
South Africa and Australia. Forest areas protected 
by easements are proving attractive to purchasers 
because they have high conservation values.36
The case for conservation opportunities in com-
munity-held land may be more complex although 
there is a significant body of work that tends to 
affirm that legally recognized and defendable 
community ownership can be more effective in 
maintaining at least some high conservation val-
ues than outright government control.37  The catch, 
however, is whether these values are the same as 
the ones that the international community would 
like to see conserved!  Notwithstanding that par-
ticular caveat, the general principle still holds that 
irrespective of whether private control and man-
agement is community-based or individual based 
clear and defendable rights are a pre-requisite for 
contractual arrangements governing the provision 
of environmental goods and services. 
A new generation of programs have been imple-
mented in some countries to enable communities 
to capture financial resources for conservation 
initiatives by investing in community conserva-
tion capacity, such as the community conservation 
programs in Mexico38 and Central America39 and in 
Ghana.40 
9 current initiatives to conserve biodiversity
 in private land holdings
There are numerous examples of attempts to pro-
vide incentives for the conservation of biodiversity 
on lands that are in private ownership or where use 
rights have been awarded to individuals, communi-
ties or corporations. Many private individuals and 
community groups, both in rich and poor coun-
tries, value biodiversity on their land. The home 
gardens of Java, Sri Lanka, Viet Nam and elsewhere 
in south-east Asia are excellent examples. Almost 
all traditional communities take measures to 
maintain biodiversity for utilitarian, aesthetic and 
cultural reasons. 
There are technical obstacles to reconciling biodi-
versity conservation with extractive use. Many of 
these stem from our limited knowledge of biodiver-
sity and of its tolerance of environmental change. 
A consortium of conservation and human rights 
organizations supported by several industrial 
stakeholders has formed a High Conservation Value 
Forest (HCVF) network that promotes international 
collaboration on identifying and seeking optimal 
management arrangements for locations that 
have special biodiversity values. HCVF designation 
draws attention to the needs for special conserva-
tion measures to be applied to private or state-
owned land to reconcile productive use with both 
social and environmental conservation needs.
Numerous national and international initiatives 
have been taken to favor the maintenance of biodi-
versity in forests managed for timber. Independent 
forest certification schemes require that biodi-
versity values be maintained. The International 
Tropical Timber Organization is in the final stages 
of adopting Guidelines for the Conservation of 
Biological Diversity in Tropical Production Forests. 
These Guidelines provide a broad overview of the 
issues relating to the management of corporate 
and private forests at a landscape scale in ways 
that favor both local and global biodiversity 
values.41
 emerging issues: opportunities and threats
Much historical conservation planning has been 
rooted in a philosophy of achieving a stable 
“steady-state” based upon rational, objective analy-
sis of land potential and the perceived threats to 
conservation. However the opportunities for land 
and the society’s perceptions of the needs for 
conservation are constantly changing. The most 
obvious current example is the challenge pre-
sented by climate change to the resiliency of pro-
tected areas. Under emerging changes in climatic 
conditions many existing protected areas will no 
longer be suitable for the species assemblages 
that they were designed to protect. State-driven 
approaches to conservation that are predicated on 
resisting perceived external threats to an area’s 
biodiversity through permanent gazettement 
and a rigid fences and fines approach may simply 
be irrelevant under extreme climate change. The 
recent spike in food and other commodity prices 
has major implications for land use around the 
world. Areas that appeared to have little com-
mercial potential suddenly become attractive for 
the production of biofuels or fiber crops. A society 
intent on economic growth may choose to give 
preference to employment and incomes over the 
non-instrumental values of biodiversity. These 
sorts of concerns are encouraging the conservation 
movement to be more concerned about managing 
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for resilience than managing to preserve the status 
quo. Resilience requires getting the balance right 
between social and human capital and environ-
mental values. Skills, competencies and effective 
institutions will be more important than designa-
tions on maps as the challenges of global change 
unfold. Land that is important for productive use 
today may be significant for broader environmen-
tal values tomorrow and vice versa. Initiatives such 
as the meso-America biological corridor provide an 
interesting example of measures to encourage a 
large number of individual, community, corporate 
and governmental land owners to harness their di-
vergent interests to a shared agenda for maintain-
ing biodiversity in a changing landscape.
An increasing number of conservation practitio-
ners now agree that effective negotiation and 
management of multi-functional landscapes will 
provide the best way forward in dealing with the 
emerging challenges of climate change and that 
individual and community land holdings and clar-
ity of access, use and commercial rights will be an 
important part of the equation.42 
A vast range of external considerations may be tak-
en into account to determine the optimal balance 
of tenure and use right arrangements. Situations 
change with time and both the opportunities for 
alternative land uses and the wishes of society will 
not be constant in the long term. The process of 
negotiation and adaptation will be continuous, but 
there are some important factors that influence 
the achievement of successful outcomes. Thus, 
solutions that work in densely settled forest-poor 
areas may not work in sparsely settled forest-rich 
areas. The ability to enforce agreements through 
the courts is an important determinant of the vi-
ability of the different approaches.
The achievement of many biodiversity objectives 
requires that conservationists work at large spatial 
scales. This does not match well with the fact that 
the use and ownership issues of the poor often 
have to be dealt with at smaller spatial scales. 
There is often a mismatch of operating scale. 
Achieving a land-cover matrix that meets these 
large-scale conservation needs, while also being 
consistent with local development needs, is pos-
sible. But this requires functioning institutional 
and legal systems and a detailed knowledge of 
biodiversity that is often not found in developing 
countries. Achieving habitat continuity and an 
optimal protection of the habitats of species of 
conservation importance is already difficult in dy-
namic landscapes with multiple small owners and 
fine patterns of local use rights.  It can be made 
all the more challenging if conservationists insist 
on using only permanent arrangements to secure 
public goods values. Their reluctance to embrace 
temporary or short-term arrangements means 
that promising outcomes are needlessly lost.  For 
example, in Finland net conservation gains across 
the landscape increased when landowners were 
given the option to negotiate a 10-year renewable 
biodiversity agreement rather than have a perma-
nent conservation easement imposed on their land 
by government agencies.  On the other hand, many 
small farmers continue to regularly clear second-
ary forest regeneration from low productivity 
pasture lands in the tropics, not because they wish 
to stock the land immediately, but out of concern 
that, if they allow a young secondary forest to es-
tablish, they will lose the right to convert that land 
back to agriculture in the future.  The net result is 
less secondary forest and less connectivity across 
the landscape at any one point in time.
 which approaches work where?
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Achieving full understanding of all the interests of 
local forest users and of those aspiring to own for-
est land takes time. Use and traditional ownership 
rights are often confusing to outsiders, are difficult 
to adapt to national legal frameworks, often over-
lap and are the subject of long-standing disputes 
and competition. Outsiders moving too quickly to 
establish local use and ownership regimes without 
fully understanding local conditions will result in 
contested and unsustainable outcomes. The alter-
native is an approach which builds up to the larger 
landscape step-by-step through what is known in 
social science as progressive contextualization. 
However, experience in this is limited thus far.  
Negotiating and enforcing conservation easements 
on private forests and community-based use rights 
for protected areas will be complex and will require 
technical competence of conservation organiza-
tions and a regulatory capacity that is often lack-
ing, especially in tropical forest countries.
The problem is rendered even more intractable 
because conservation advocates are often surpris-
ingly unclear about their precise objectives for 
conservation. They frequently fall back on threat-
based arguments related to extent of protection 
and minimization of disturbance and are unable to 
define the precise outcomes that would meet their 
needs. There is still a lack of the knowledge that 
would enable us to predict the impact upon the 
targets of conservation of low-level uses of forest 
resources. The technical capacity to negotiate ac-
ceptable levels of use or disturbance of protected 
forests is often lacking because the measurement 
and monitoring of both livelihood and biodiversity 
outcomes has been so poor.
Advocates of awarding local tenure and use rights 
are often motivated by a sense of urgency. They 
want to protect local users against immediate 
external threats to the forests. They often want to 
award the strongest rights possible in the shortest 
possible time. Equally conservationists have also 
been excessively hasty in imposing their pro-
grammes on local people. Far too many protected 
areas have been established with little study of 
local rights and tenure issues. There is a need for 
all parties to recognize the need to negotiate more 
complex and sustainable arrangements under 
which stewardship of conservation values could 
be reconciled with local livelihood interests. For 
conservationists this means not only engaging in 
longer-term processes that ensure that all values 
and the rights of all stakeholders are adequately 
taken into account, but also shifting from a con-
servation model designed primarily to mitigate 
generalized threats to one that seeks to achieve 
specified outcomes.
This situation is illustrated by recent events in the 
Indonesia provinces of Papua and West Papua. 
Moves to map and give legitimacy to traditional 
clan forest territories have been motivated by 
fears that industrial investors will take over these 
lands for logging or industrial plantations with 
minimal or no benefits for the traditional owners. 
However traditional rights are complex, overlap-
ping and constantly subject to local re-negotiation. 
Defining them in law on the basis of surveys will 
ultimately help to prevent land grabs by outsid-
ers, but the process often also involves the need 
for clans to negotiate with one another, and to 
settle old disputes, before they can unite to do so.  
In many cases the disputes may be intractable. In 
other parts of the world rising population densities 
and spreading modern infrastructure disrupt mi-
gratory routes and increase the competitive pres-
sures for land between pastoralists and sedentary 
farmers. This is a particular problem in drier parts 
of Africa where forests are beset with overlapping 
and conflicting traditional rights.  External players 
need to be careful not to further exacerbate ten-
sions with well-intentioned interventions that try 
to find quick fix resolutions to age old problems.43
Optimal solutions will be complex and tailored 
to local conditions, and they will require strong 
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institutional capacity to enforce agreements. In 
many forest frontier areas none of these precondi-
tions are met.
Legal systems and cadastral capacity in many coun-
tries make it difficult to achieve a good balance be-
tween local rights regarding use and conservation. 
Hierarchies of laws often make it difficult to deter-
mine which laws should prevail over others. Often 
rights enshrined in national constitutions and 
fundamental laws are inconsistent with sectoral 
laws and regulations.44 National and sub-national 
spatial planning processes often contain internal 
inconsistencies and contradictions. Sorting out the 
complexity of legal and regulatory frameworks in 
an equitable and participatory way takes a great 
deal of time and resources and itself requires an ef-
fective rule of law, strong sectoral institutions and 
the capacity to resolve conflicts.
There is rarely a single best solution. The problems 
of reconciling local ownership and use rights with 
larger scale conservation goals can be addressed in 
different ways and what is optimal will vary from 
place to place and over time. The four Scandinavian 
countries have all taken different courses of action 
in dealing with ownership and use rights of Saami 
and other reindeer herding populations, and each 
of the solutions chosen has its strengths and weak-
nesses. 
Payments for environmental services and a range 
of compensatory measures exist in some countries 
to reimburse people for the loss of private-use op-
tions that is needed to protect environmental pub-
lic goods. The capacity to implement such schemes 
does not yet exist in most tropical developing 
countries where most of the world’s biodiversity 
is found. Even when such schemes are attempted, 
they often reveal the alarming local costs of reduc-
ing the intensity of use of forest lands.
 legacy problems remain
In most developed countries the processes of 
establishing forest ownership and rights has un-
folded over centuries and even the establishment 
of conservation areas sometimes took decades 
of negotiation with local stakeholders. In the 
developing world many conservation areas were 
established quickly and with little local consulta-
tion because conservation organizations were so 
much more powerful than local residents. In many 
tropical developing countries any land that was 
not actively cultivated was considered a fair target 
for establishment of a protected area. Some such 
areas have now achieved international recognition 
as having global biodiversity values, while others 
clearly have lower conservation values. In many 
cases local people still contest their rights to use or 
own these areas and in a surprisingly large number 
of cases people still live within, farm and exercise 
use rights within designated protected areas.45 
There are recent estimates that 10 percent of the 
world’s protected areas are farmed. It is not un-
usual to find situations where people have de facto 
or even legal ownership rights within areas that 
are also designated as state owned conservation 
areas. Resolving these difficult historical legacies 
will take time, technically competent institutions, 
skilled facilitation and a reliable and sensitized 
legal system to enforce agreements. In addition, 
recent analysis of public protected areas budgets 
reveal serious lack of budget for basic manage-
ment costs, particularly for local park rangers, 
relative to the expected management standards 
for those areas or to the conservation investments 
by communities in those areas they consider a 
priority.46 
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The problems posed have no simple solution. 
However, some basic principles may have general 
application:
There is no panacea. Every situation is differ-• 
ent and persons or organizations engaging 
with processes of land rights and tenure re-
form in forest areas of high conservation value 
must have an in-depth understanding of local 
issues and a broad knowledge of how these 
issues have been addressed elsewhere.47
Conservation organizations must move away • 
from a rigid commitment to preserving the sta-
tus quo. They must recognize that societies’ 
perceptions of their needs for conservation 
will change just as climate and economic de-
terminants of biodiversity outcomes change. 
Resilience and adaptive capacity is going to be 
more important than “steady state” threats-
based approaches. Tenure and use rights are 
going to be among the things that change, and 
conservation organizations will have to work 
with this change.
The historical reality that has allowed global • 
conservation values to prevail consistently 
over local development values has to be chal-
lenged, especially where conservationists, 
by attaching infinite value to a species or an 
ecosystem, refuse to set limits on how much 
they really need to conserve. It is no longer 
acceptable that poor people in the developing 
world should, with no or inadequate com-
pensation, have to forgo use of resources in 
favour of some hypothetical future benefit to 
global society of a species that happens to live 
in their backyard.
The present ground rules for international • 
conservation are firmly rooted in the land 
ethics of a few industrialized countries. As 
other nations emerge as influential players on 
the world stage it is inevitable that different 
perspectives on conservation and develop-
ment needs will become more influential. 
Globalization will provide strong impetus for 
privatization and for exploitation of com-
parative advantage and economies of scale. 
These changes will have profound influences 
on what is and is not possible in terms of 
protected areas and special restrictions on 
intensity of use. Conservationists will severely 
limit their own options to find creative and 
adaptive solutions if they continue to remain 
in a state of denial about these changes. 
Serious dangers are inherent in moving too • 
quickly and with insufficient local knowledge 
to achieve rights and tenure reform or to 
establish new protected areas. It takes a long 
time and a lot of local empathy to understand 
the complexity of the issues, and one has to 
engage for the period that will be needed to 
negotiate equitable and technically sound 
outcomes.  Both conservationist and social 
justice activists need to be more “seeker” than 
“planner” and allow locally-owned options to 
emerge.
Strengthening the capacity of the institu-• 
tions addressing rights and tenure reform 
and enforcing agreements will often have to 
occur in parallel with the reform process itself. 
This may require considerable resources. For 
instance, cadastral services in most tropical 
forest countries lack the capacity to underpin 
a regulatory framework for rapid changes in 
tenure arrangements.
Too many conservation programmes contain • 
time bombs in the form of frustrated local 
stakeholders who will continue to contest 
the legitimacy of the historical decisions 
upon which conservation programmes were 
based. As democracy spreads and popula-
tion densities rise, these latent land disputes 
will surface and conservation organizations 
should anticipate them and deal with them 
 the way forward
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proactively. 
There is a risk that environmental degrada-• 
tion can occur if private or community tenure 
is awarded without effective accompanying 
institutional and regulatory capacity to nego-
tiate easements aimed at protecting public 
goods values. The most notable example is, 
when control of forests was rapidly decentral-
ized in Indonesia, the absence of local capac-
ity to manage the resource. 
Conservation organizations must acquire • 
detailed knowledge of the species and ecosys-
tems that they wish to conserve and must be 
explicit about their goals. They must have the 
capacity to monitor the impacts on biodiver-
sity outcomes of any local ownership or use 
rights that are put in place.
Stakeholders must recognize that rights and • 
restrictions applied to both protected areas 
and private forest lands will inevitably need to 
be adapted and changed over time—one can 
neither expect to come up with the definitive 
solution at the first attempt nor assume that 
what works now will continue to work in the 
future.
Credible and enforceable environmental • 
service payment schemes will be essential 
to ensure the conservation of public goods 
environmental services on private and 
community-managed land.48 Clarity of rights 
and tenure, as well as reliable, transparent 
and efficient distributional mechanisms, are 
essential if such payment schemes are to have 
any chance of succeeding.  If successful, these 
schemes enable co-investment with communi-
ties already financing local initiatives in high 
conservation value sites.
Landscape approaches whereby appropriate • 
matrices of land under different intensities of 
production and protection and under diverse 
ownership and rights regimes represent the 
best way forward in reconciling local develop-
ment needs with broader scale conservation 
goals. But landscape approaches take time 
and require skilled facilitation and a long time 
to yield benefits.
There is urgent need for some practical guid-• 
ance on how rights-based approaches can be 
applied in natural resource conservation and 
management.  Currently there is a surfeit of 
theory and not enough critical analysis of case 
studies. 
Overall it is clear that there is no simple “one size 
fits all” answer to the problem of reconciling local 
rights to lands and resources with the goal of con-
serving the public goods values of biodiversity. Os-
trom et al.49 have argued persuasively against the 
pursuit of simple panaceas for resolving resource 
conflicts. Different mixes of solutions will be ap-
propriate in different situations. As the world’s 
population grows and its demands for resources 
increase it is inevitable that land will have to be 
used more intensively and efficiently. The propor-
tion of the earth’s surface allocated exclusively to 
conservation has risen rapidly in recent decades. 
This tendency is unlikely to continue and may well 
be reversed. The areas allocated exclusively for 
conservation will be smaller and more biodiversity 
will need to be conserved in managed landscape 
mosaics. Private and communal ownership and 
rights are likely to increasingly apply to areas that 
are important for conservation. This tendency car-
ries with it a significant risk for conservation but it 
also provides opportunities. The degree to which 
biodiversity is conserved will depend upon the 
interest and incentives of individual and commu-
nal land owners, the effectiveness of conservation 
institutions and the ability of societies to reconcile 
disputes, defend rights and apply, and where nec-
essary reform, the rule of law.
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